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God Against Empire:
Implicit Imperialism, Deliberative Democracy and
Global Civil Society
Gary M. Simpson
Professor of Systematic Theology, Luther SeminGly
St. Paul, Minnesota
God is against empire, obviously. Or is it so obvious? Throughout the
ages Eastern and Western Christians have lived comfortably within
empires. Regularly, we have even legitimated, constructed, and ruled
Christian empires. Eusebius of Caesarea (c. AD 260-340) made the
classic Christian argument, largely persuasive in that epoch. First, the
biblical God had personally and precisely directed history to
culminate in the Roman Empire. Second, God had personally raised
up Constantine and precisely equipped him to be the emperor capable
of making the Roman empire godly, indeed, Christian. ' So, given the
long history of Christian arguments, which adopted and adapted
Eusebius's basic case, why does it appear so obvious to many
Christians today that the biblical God is against empire? Ironically,
we unwittingly promote empire to the extent that we simply assume
that God is self-evidently against empire. Call this assumption
"routinized empire ungodliness."
Those today who intend empire and who aspire to invent a US
empire count on routinized empire ungodliness. In fact, the United
States is a classic instance of routinized empire ungodliness. We are
a country born by a revolution against imperial power because God is
against empire. We have engraved this in our most sacred document,
The Declaration of Independence. Tragically, however, routinized
empire ungodliness helps to cloak an emerging implicit imperialism.
Implicit imperialism looms just beneath the surface of US
routinized empire ungodliness. Actually US public life seems more
like an amorphous muddle of implicit imperialism and routinized
empire ungodliness. But it could get worse! The inventors of implicit
imperialism will - when the time is right (say, for example, after a
horrific terrorist attack of staggering proportions beyond even the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [hereafter 9/ 11]) - uncover
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and unleash a full term, full spectrum, explicit empire. The world's
only hopeF
Now again is the time to make an explicit public case that God is
against empire and how God is against empire. This case will help us
to see through the implicit imperialism already being prototyped right
under our noses. Since the Soviet Union and its empire collapsed in
1989, the US has taken on the self-consciousness of "the only
remaining superpower." Neo-con internationalists have used the 9/1 1
atrocity to stimulate an erotic of imperial power. Finally, we must
root a persuasive critique of empire in what the biblical God is "for"
in the international sphere.
Our inquiry will take seven turns. First, I will explore the nature of
the assertion, "God is against empire." Second, I will outline the
historic modem forms of empire and the classic rationales for empire as
a backdrop for perceiving "implicit imperialism." Third, I will pose the
question of implicit imperialism in the context of an emerging and
ascending neo-con internationalism. Fourth, I will examine "the Bush
doctrine" as the public face of implicit imperialism. Fifth, I will analyze
the 2003-2004 Iraq War within the context of implicit imperialism.
Sixth, I will explore how the biblical God is accomplishing epochmaking good through the emergence of civil society and deliberative
democracy. Finally, I will suggest that by honouring God in the
emerging global civil society we are critical patticipants in God's
preferential option for an international rule of just law.

1. The Nature of the Assertion, "God Is against Empire"
Biblically speaking, empire is neither commanded nor forbidden. The
ancient Stoics provided the category for such phenomena: adiaphora
or, as the Latin scholars translated it, "indifferent things." Throughout
the centuries Christians have appropriated this Stoic category,
sometimes uncritically and thus detrimentally, and at other times
more critically and thus fruitfully. An example of the former is when
Christians appropriated the Stoic claim that passions and emotions
per se are indifferent, merely bodily externals that make no positive
contribution to the moral life and, indeed in the view of some
Christians, even mortally imperil the moral life. A critical and fruitful
appropriation happened when, during the Reformation era
adiaphorist controversy, Lutheranism's Formula of Concord deemed
that under certain circumstances even adiaphora, things neither
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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commanded nor forbidden by God, could be an occasion for tempus
confessionis, a time for confessing.' The so-called Second
Adiaphorist Controversy of the seventeenth century pertains to our
situation regarding empire because it involved Christian theological
assessments of public life.~
Christian public theology and ethics addresses things both
biblically commanded and forbidden by God as well as things neither
biblically commanded nor forbidden by God, that is, adiaphora. An
example of something commanded by God, which public theology
and ethics addresses, is divinely instituted political authority. An
example of something forbidden by God, which public theology and
ethics addresses, is holy war and crusade executed under the sign of
the cross.s An inquiry regarding empire entails public theology and
ethics addressing an adiaphoron.
"Now wait a minute!" perhaps you are thinking, or even
shouting. "Empire cannot be an adiaphoron because it is so weighty.
Are not adiaphora 'indifferent' things and therefore unimportant?"
Lutherans usually remember clearly that polity, especially church
polity, is a matter of adiaphora. That is, neither churchly nor worldly
polity is scripturally laid down in stone for all times and places. From
this conviction, however, we have drawn the false conclusion that
adiaphora are theologically unimportant, uninteresting, even neutral.
Calling adiaphora "indifferent" things lulls us towards this
supposition. But that supposition goes against the intention of this
Lutheran teaching.
Our Lutheran memory needs sharpening in three ways. First,
polity matters! Without doubt, both churchly and temporal polity
matter. They matter to the world because they matter to the biblical
God who created this world to flourish and continually creates it so.
Second, because neither churchly nor worldly polity is scripturally
laid down in stone for all times and places, therefore both entail the
historical variability of God's continuing creativity. Finally, because
churchly and temporal polities are adiaphora, thereby debatable
variables of God's continuing creativity, we ought, of course,
therefore, to deliberate them. We ought to deliberate them,
vigorously, for each time and place with all the theological and
ethical resources and skills that we can bring to the task. Such
theological and ethical deliberation is the very prototype of a
theological-ethical task. 6
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We study empire in the concrete and this brings a difficulty. Our
inquiry meets partisan politics. In the 2000 US presidential election
the electorate was evenly divided. A January 2004 Gallup
Organization study revealed that Republicans and Democrats were
evenly divided, each holding 45% of the popular vote. In one way the
divide in 2004 looks a lot like the 2000 presidential divide. In another
way the divide is different. Since 9/11 and the 2003-04 Iraq War,
issues that often internally divide Democrats have moved to the
foreground, while issues that often internally divide Republics have
moved to the background. The form of the United States'
international spirit is such an issue.
A caveat is therefore prudent. There is a risk in the way that I
make my case, especially because I situate the Iraq War and "the
Bush doctrine" squarely within the context of imperialism. To many
that seems, well, just plain extreme, conspiratorial, or even
unpatriotic. Take for example, the reprimand by David Horowitz, a
well-known convert to neo-conservatism from left liberalism.
And while it may be perfectly reasonable to argue
about the justification to go to war, calling the
president a deceiver and accusing him of sacrificing
Americans for no particular cause is not a reasonable
argument. It is a stab in the back of the commander in
chief and the nation whose security he is defending.
And not only in respect to the president but to all
Americans, especially the troops in harms way. 7
To guard the nation against back-stabbing traitors is a rational
suspicion. I, myself, have this suspicion though the "back-stab"
rhetoric tends toward repression. Surely, in a nation "of the people,
by the people, for the people" everyone bears the calling of vigilance.
To safeguard the President and the Presidency is normative
patriotism. A nation of, by, and for the people, however, dare never
confuse critical vigilance with quiet compliance.~ Doth Horowitz
commend compliance?
Generally, critics of the President do not rebuke him for
executing the War "for no particular cause." That certainly is not my
objection. Quite the contrary! The President, under neo-con
influence, has a "particular cause," implicit imperialism. To explicate
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2

God Against Empire

13

that cause is one important task; another is to expose deception and
its historic rationale and purpose.

2. Empire and Implicit Imperialism
In his January 20, 2004 State of the Union Address President George
W. Bush sought to reassure the United States, an assurance heard
around the world: "America is a nation with a mission, and that
mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to
dominate, no ambitions of empire." 9 That the president had to tender
this assurance itself indicates that real "empire" merits investigation.
Four days later in Davos, Switzerland, Vice President Dick Cheney
sought again to disavow any US ambition to empire. "If we were to
empire, we would currently preside over a much greater piece of the
Earth's surface than we do. That's not the way we operate." 10 Of
course, the 2003-2004 Iraq War precipitates these executive
disavowals. The Vice President's definition of empire as one nationstate politically presiding over other nation-states' territories obliges
us to examine the different forms of empire less we miss the factual
form before us and how the Iraq War reveals implicit imperialism.
Empire always carries both internal and external dimensions.
Implicit imperialism does likewise. I concentrate on external
international dynamics, but this does not imply that internal domestic
dynamics are less significant. International and domestic dynamics
remain linked. For instance, domestic systemic deception facilitates
the execution of imperial internationalism. Indeed, systemic
deception is a tell-tale mark.
One recognized definition of empire states: "the policy of a state
aiming to establish control beyond its borders over people unwilling
to accept such control." 11 The word "control" is a strong word and
may seem on a first read to imply the control of territory by means of
military force or by an imposed law backed by force. Of course, it can
mean that and, as we will see, that is one classic form of empire; but
it is not the only form. Since the fifteenth century there have been
three broad periods of empire. The first period runs roughly from the
fifteen through the eighteenth centuries. The empires built by
England, France, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, and often in
competition with each other, colonized the Americas, India, and the
East Indies. Spain and Portugal geographically partitioned the nonChristian world by drawing a line through the Atlantic Ocean. Each
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could claim and occupy territory on their agreed upon side of the line.
Portugal agreed to stay east of the line and Spain to stay west ofthe
line. While Portugal's territory made for barely an empire, Spain
colonized a great swath of the Americas. Spain's overseas territories
became and remained the King's private estate.
The second period runs from the nineteenth century until World
War I. Russian, Italy, Japan, and the United States all, to some extent,
entered the empire picture. Legalized ownership backed by military
force receded into the background as the defining form of empire.
Indirect, especially financial, control became the preferred form of
imperialism. The birth of the League ofNations at the close ofWorld
War I kept this form of imperialism in check for barely a decade.
The third period runs from 1930 through the 1980s. Imperial
Japan, fascist Italy, nationalist-socialist Germany, and communist
Russia invented empire in an aggressive totalitarian form that
incorporated elements of both previous forms. Vice President Cheney
rejects only the form of empire characterized by "legalized,"
territorial ownership and backed by military force, which dominated
the first period of empire and which was revived in totalitarian mode
in the third period. History teaches that the economic costs of that
form are high and unsustainable for the seat of empire. Further, it
teaches that the burden of misery where the boot of control meets the
seized territory is not humanly tolerable for long. Neo-cons know
this. They also know that "legalized" territorial seizure is not the only
historic form.
We can see how different forms by reviewing the four classic
justifications for the modem forms of empire. The first justification
draws on an economic rationale. Simply put, an efficient empire
provides economic benefits for all. Classical liberals like Adam Smith
(181h century) and David Ricardo (early 19'h century) rejected the
economic argument for empire. They noted that a few elites do benefit
greatly, but the nation as a whole and the empire as a whole does not
proportionately. Ironically, Smith had inspired the more economically
focused form of empire because he had argued that territory was not
the sole source of imperial wealth and that labor was an increasing
source of wealth. Classical Marxists like Vladimir Lenin (20'" century)
and Nikolai Bukharin (20'h century) also rejected the economic
argument in its particularly capitalist form. They viewed capitalism
and imperialism as identical in capitalism's late stage. National
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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capitalist economies become monopolistic and are forced to conquer
foreign outlets to accommodate their overproduction and foreign
sources to acquire cheaper raw materials and labor.
A second modern justification for empire draws on a human
nature rationale. In brief, human beings engage in a natural struggle
for survival and for dominance. Niccolo Machiavelli (16'h century),
Francis Bacon (17'h century), Thomas Hobbes (17'h century), Herbert
Spencer (19'h century), Ludwig Gumplowicz (19'h century), Adolf
Hitler (20'h century), and Benito Mussolini (20'h century) among
others typify this argument. The overwhelmingly powerful will
ruthlessly rule over the masses - masses who otherwise would only
engage in a perpetual war of all against all. Classic political
liberalism has rejected this view and offered the equal rights tradition
in its place.
A third modern justification for empire draws on national
security and strategic arguments. This rationale for empire aims to
establish and maintain buffer states equipped with military bases, and
to control communication and strategic command of military
resources. The seat of empire uses vassal buffer states as satellites.
These satellite nations receive both security and economic assistance,
not much different from the ancient practice of a mercenary army.
This has been the dominant post-World War II imperial rationale Y
A fourth modern justification for empire feeds off a moral
rationale, at times harmonized with a religiously missionary tenor.
This is the classic noblesse oblige of a permanent aristocracy now
practiced on an international stage. ' 3 Those of high birth, social
standing, economic wealth, and political-military power carry special
obligations of generosity to care for those of lesser birth, standing,
wealth, and power for the latter's own good. The seat of empire
armed with this moral rationale stresses the sacrifices it makes for the
betterment of those ruled and the resolve that it takes on the part of
the empire to be so sacrificially beneficent. After all we aristocrats
"wouldn't have to" and "it's for their own good."
People typically assume that ancient Rome justified the pax
Romana according to a human nature rationale akin to the second one
above. There is an element of truth in that assumption. But the human
nature argument requires a ubiquitous, overwhelming military force.
Roman moralists offered a more effective strategy based upon an
aristocratic moral vision. Aristocrats resolutely practiced their
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
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honour-shame culture on a daily basis throughout the Empire. This
comprehensive set of practices maintained the Empire more
effectively and in a way that no standing army could possible do
because of the expensive.
When the honour-shame society frayed, which constantly
happened, the Empire would send in the cavalry to apply force and to
mend the tear in the honour-shame cloth. When the cavalry met a
full-scale revolt, the Empire would deploy the overwhelming power
of its standing anny until the cavalry could handle it again and
eventually hand back the honour-shame cloth to the aristocracy. The
pax Romana relied upon critical intelligence, preemptive force,
precision strikes, and military mobility. '4
These four rationales are not mutually exclusive. Historically
imperialists have combined them. Sometimes hegemonic theorists use
one rationale to reinforce another; at other times an imperialist will
publicly hail one rationale in order to provide cover for the true
justification of empire. In the latter situation imperial advocates
publicly air and aim a certain rationale to convince a broad public with
common needs and concerns. The tacit rationale, inaudible to the
general public, serves the interests of a few who are spoken to quietly
though clearly. For instance, an imperial herald might publicly
proclaim a national security rationale for empire that masks a tacit,
crony capitalist, economic rationale primarily benefiting the elite.
This is the classic setting of ideology. Historically, those with
imperial ambition use arguments that draw from the natural right to
safety in the third historic rationale or from the natural obligation to
beneficence in the fourth historic rationale in order to cloak the first
two historic rationales, which appear to many to be little more than
slavery or tyranny. These public cloaking strategies divulge
systematically distorted communication. Moreover, systemic
deception funds the implicitness of implicit imperialism. Finally,
systemic deception is the feedback loop between the international and
domestic sides of implicit imperialism. '5
Nearly fifty years ago Reinhold Niebuhr said, "The final question
is where the empire of the American super-state fits into this
gradation of value [the costs and benefits both intended and collateral
of the various forms of empire]; and where the empire which is so
desperately anxious not to be an empire stands." 16 At the close of the
1950s Niebuhr argued that balancing the two great empires was the
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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only real way forward. To make this argument he had to confess
empire. Today's neo-cons refuse to make that confession publicly, a
refusal they consider to be wise. We must engage neo-con
internationalists because they frame both President Bush's disavowal
of empire and "the Bush doctrine" that executes implicit imperialism.

3. Neo-con Internationalism as Implicit Imperialism
Neo-con theorists aim to sculpt the future by controlling the form of
US internationalism. Paul Wolfowitz notes, "In a world where
American primacy seems so overwhelming ... [t]he ultimate test of
foreign policy is how successfully it shapes the future." 17 Neo-cons
assert that during the last quarter century "the world [has] indeed
been transformed in America's image. " 18 They seek to strengthen and
extend that benevolent transformation, "above all, preserving and
reinforcing America's benevolent global hegemony" (6). This
discourse of"benevolent global hegemony" cotTesponds to the moral
rationale for empire. Neo-con internationalists refuse- wisely as they
see it - to use the word "empire." Despite this refusal they sponsor
and speak "empire" nevertheless. Call it, "implicit imperialism."
How is this so?
Neo-con internationalists denounce "a return to normal times"
and decry the US ever becoming again "a normal nation" (9-12).
Instead, they compare US power and prestige to that exercised when
"Rome dominated the Mediterranean world" (6). They do not
envision America being a mere "saviour of last resort" for world
peace or a "reluctant sheriff' enforcing justice (15-16). Such callings
betray a weak and wimpy America. George Will, the influential neocon journalist, thinks this wimpy leadership is due to "the
feminization" of leadership, of politics, and of internationalism. Will
desires "manly" leadership, "the modern prince," remasculinization. 19
Neo-con theorists announce the new calling, the preferred future.
The "United States would instead conceive of itself as at once a
European power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of
course, a Western Hemisphere power" ( 15-16). Above all, neo-cons
pursue a "unipolar era" (6). "A multipolar world ... would be far
more dangerous" than the unipolar world of US "benevolent global
hegemony."~0 Later, we will follow up on the clue given by George
Will regarding "the prince."
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
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The 1990s saw little difference between Democrats and
Republicans, between liberals and conservatives, say the neo-cons.
Everyone confessed and practiced either wimpy "liberal
internationalism" (by and large Democrats) or international
"isolationism" (by and large Republicans), or a Cold War realism
with a missing rival (both Democrats and Republicans). During the
mid to late 1990s the neo-cons strategized to transform the
Republican Party by denouncing isolationism. This denunciation
bore abundant fruit only after 9/ 11.
During the 1990s neo-cons internationalists enunciated preemptive "regime change" "as a central component" of its doctrine. 11
Neo-cons "regard military force as an instrument of foreign policy to
be called upon when necessary to achieve our goals. A bit more
abstractly, but no less importantly, [neo-con] internationalists find
worth and dignity in the nation committing itself to this kind of
enterprise .... " Theodore Roosevelt set the precedent at the dawn of
the twentieth century. Theodore Rex, after all, privileged "warlike
intervention by the civilized powers [which] would contribute
directly to the peace ofthe world."
Neo-con internationalists claim that "America's benevolent
global hegemony" comports and conducts itself by blending
universal moral principle with US national interest. The principles
cited are democracy and free-market capitalism. Many find it difficult
to object to neo-con rhetoric because of the abstract manner in which
they time and again intone these principles. In fact, they stay on
message so monotonously and vacuously that you might even
imagine them hiring a Madison Avenue marketing firm to write this
part of their script. Publicly they intone these principles as abstractly
as possible. Among themselves they hold a specific, concrete form of
democracy, an aristocratic form of democracy, which we will
investigate in part six below.11
The neo-con notion of "statesmanship" betrays their aristocratic
ethos. Neo-cons note that the move from principles to the application of
principles means taking contingent circumstances into consideration.
This move to application, say the neo-cons, distinguishes them from
idealists, who also claim to be principled. Neo-cons are adamant in this.
Applying principles means always weighing competing interests and
objectives. Neo-con "statesmanship" consists of"melding the necessities
of the moment with our strategic objectives and moral ideals."13
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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Well, so far so good. Neo-con statesmanship partakes of a classic
difference between Plato and Aristotle. Plato, the idealist, would have
the philosopher-king, angelically from above, employing his pure
reason (nous) to rule disinterestedly (and thereby in self-delusion by
Aristotle's judgment). Aristotle, the principled pragmatist, would
have the statesman, fully embodied in the contingencies and
ambiguities of this world, employing his practical wisdom
(phronesis) to rule the mix of interests and situations before him. If
this were the forced choice I would recommend Aristotle's path. In
part six below, we will see how civil society significantly revisions
"practical reason," which signals a critical departure from an
aristocratic ethos toward a deliberative ethos.
At this point, however, neo-con internationalists selfconsciously take the troubling turn that constitutes the imperialist
impulse itself, and that legitimates the systemic deception at the
heart of implicit imperialism. Paul Wolfowitz immediately follows
up the statecraft "melding" of circumstantial necessity, strategy, and
moral ideal with this conclusion: "Thus, foreign policy decisions
cannot be subject to the kind of 'rule of law' that we want for our
domestic political process."14 Note the cleavage! The neo-con future
privileges an enduring aristocratic internationalism! Four great
millstones fasten around this conclusion and plunge it into the
swirling sea of empire.
In the neo-con moral world the United States should aspire aspire! - to live autonomously from the rule of law. The first
millstone! Neo-con internationalists desire the US to be "the man" of
the world. "Who, then, will rule the ruler?" This is an ancient Western
inquiry, asked classically by Plutarch and debated throughout the
Middle Ages and Renaissance.15 The US settled the question for itself
at its founding. We are a nation "of laws, and not ofmen."16 Will neocons overturn this birthright of the United States of America?
Plutarch reasoned that "law" was embodied in the person of the
ruler, and, as we mentioned at the outset, Eusebius of Caesarea gave
Plutarch's reasoning a Christian theological spin. Neo-con
internationalists have decided resolutely in Plutarch's favorY Law is
embodied in the corporate person of the US empire and its President.
This will be the burning international question for the foreseeable
future, and it will be the context for our inquiry into global civil
society.
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The neo-con antinomian aspiration surely contradicts the stated
aspirations of the US. The US has not, however, always conducted
itself accordingly. At times our national conduct has unintentionally
yet certainly failed to follow rule of law; at other times our intentions
have been more hypocritical. Still, even hypocritical conduct proves
the old maxim: hypocrisy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue.
But neo-cons reject the virtue itself, the rule of law. A definitive
indicator of empire!
A second rope, fastened to the millstone of international
antinomianism, fixes a second millstone: "The downside is that this
[rejection of the rule of law] can cause difficulties in securing public
understanding; it often seems too much like 'trimming' or
insincerity."28 Now, there is an understatement! The downside- more
like the depths of the sea - is that the rejection of law eviscerates
public trust by undercutting the publics' vocation to hold political
authority accountable both domestically and internationally. The
second millstone!
Neo-cons do not think highly of the US publics' capacities for
public understanding and judgment. US publics lack the requisite
"perspective" and "steadfast manner." Indeed, neo-cons see public
understanding as "an obstacle to statesmanship," more so in the
international arena. As Wolfowitz is quick, and right, to point out,
"observers of democracy" for the last two hundred years have
criticized democratic publics in this way. 29 Actually, that so-called
observation is a value laden, politically inspired criticism of the
democratic thrust. That critique of democracy has existed for over
two thousand years. It springs from aristocratic superciliousness,
which has always judged the hoi polloi incapable of public
understanding and thus of self-rule embodied in the rule of law.
A third millstone shows itself immediately as neo-cons bemoan
the hardships of statesmanship: "The widely-recognized 'CNN
effect,' the fact that foreign pol icy decisions must now be made in the
glare of intensive and instantaneous publicity, certainly makes
statesmanship harder." 30 Oh, for the days of imperial opacity! For the
days of smoke-filled rooms where only "the manly," who see clearly
and carry no doubts, decide policy! This bemoaning, while it may
sound like only the personal whining of individual neo-cons and thus
merely a character weakness, entails in fact a well-considered,
comprehensive political philosophy that funds implicit imperialism.
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2

God Against Empire

21

Here we find the seed of intentional - note, not unintentional! systemic deception, the third millstone. 31 The people's public
incompetence requires the practice of systemic deception for the sake
of global order. There is a moral tone here. The third millstone:
systemic deception as public moral virtue! Can this be possible?
Neo-cons discipline themselves not to let publics get in the way
of their superior understanding and will. Neo-cons justifY systemic
under the category, "linguistic problems."'2 Use language that will not
offend the sensibilities of the US and world publics, they say. Do not
use words like "imperium" or "hegemon" because they "carry strong
connotations of dominion and empire." Such words, true in
themselves as they concede, "give offense" to publics who do not
understand their scientific, "purely descriptive" use. After all, the
embryonic empire ofneo-con internationalism aspires "not directly to
rule others," the decisive word being "directly." This routine
disavowal merely masks again the other historic fonns of and
rationales for empire.
Neo-cons learned the discipline to deal with "linguistic
problems" from personal experience. In 1992 Pentagon staffers of
Paul Wolfowitz penned the now-famous Pentagon draft of a grand
new strategy designed to preserve unipolarity by preventing the
emergence of any global rival. The draft talked about American
"primacy and predominance" and "maintain[ing] mechanisms for
deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional
or global scale." 31 Criticism came swiftly and harshly. Neo-con
linguistic discipline emerged. From here on out, expunge "indiscreet
language"! Use the discourse of "leader" or "indispensable nation,"
which was Bill Clinton's during the 1990s; saturate it, however, with
doctrines advanced by "hegemonic theory." 14
Neo-cons take the "systemic deception" page for their treatise on
implicit imperialism right from an all-star chapter in Western political
thought: chapter eighteen of Machiavelli's The Prince.
Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince
to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with
craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that
those princes who have done great things have held
good faith of little account, and have known how to
circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the
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end have overcome those who have relied on their
word ... and he who has known best how to employ
the fox has succeeded best.
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this
characteristic, and to be a great pretender and
dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to
present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will
always find someone who will allow himself to be
deceived. 35
Machiavelli models the effective ruler after Achilles of old, who
is "given to Centaur Chiron to nurse," Chiron the "half beast and half
man." In fact, two beasts make up the beast half: the lion and the fox.
The lion provides the overwhelming power and the fox provides the
"morally" necessary deceit and secrecy.
Unsurprisingly, neo-cons do not directly credit Machiavelli, not
usually. Far too foxy are they. Truly, "so much notoriety has gathered
around Machiavelli's name that the charge of being a Machiavellian
still remains a serious accusation in political debate." 36 While reading
the neo-cons; the following observation rings as true today as it did
more than half a century ago:
Therein lies the importance of The Prince in the
subsequent history of the Western world.
Machiavelli wrote a grammar of power, not only for
the sixteenth century, but for the ages that have
followed. Read The Prince today and you will be
struck by the denotations which its sentences set off
in the corridors of our experiences with present-day
rulers .... 37
Standard historical accounts depict Machiavelli's justification for
overwhelming and, when necessary, ruthless power as amoral.
The Prince has become, for better or worse, a symbol
of a whole body of literature and a whole approach
to politics. Just as in literature and art we must
always face, under whatever names, the polar
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conflict of classic and romantic, so in the history of
political thinking we have always faced the polar
conflict between the ethical and the ruthlessly
realistic.18
This depiction is not exactly correct. On the one hand, it is true;
Machiavelli did intend merely a "factual, realist" account of the
effectiveness and efficiency of overwhelming power. On the other
hand, he intended this "factual, realist" account to be nothing less than
a new kind of moral argument superior to Aristotle's. Machiavelli
thought that aristocracy was too burdened and bogged down by
classical Western virtue morality, Aristotle's and Cicero's, not to
mention Augustine's and Aquinas' .19 He kept the aristocratic political
structure but replaced the classic aristocratic virtues with his
effectiveness-plus-efficiency, consequentialist ethic. His revolutionary
proposal convinces many still today. Seldom, however, do the
convinced publicly confess their conviction regarding the axis of
overwhelming power, deceit, and secrecy.~ 0
Tethered to the neo-con rejection of international law is a fourth
millstone: "order" replaces law. World "order" not "law" is the basis
of hegemonic rule.~ ' A world, decently ordered toward US interests,
is of the highest national interest.
[The neo-con notion] of national interest begins with
the obvious point that our power relationship to the
rest of the world has changed dramatically in the last
decade. As the only nation in the world able to exert
significant power beyond its own immediate
geographical location, America now has the
opportunity to enforce an order in all theaters where
the local powers are not very great. If this
opportunity exists, so too, arguably, does an interest
in doing so, for having a decent order in the world is
clearly to our benefit .... If so many of our statesmen
in the nineteenth century publicly denied this view,
especially with regard to any potential benefits
accrued from the order established by the British
Empire, this was for reasons of our own particular
interest at a time when we were a secondary power.~~
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This is an ancient and weighty failure deep in Western public
ethics. Plato and Aristotle precipitated it in two different but related
forms. Order takes precedence over justice; or, the other form, order
is the form of justice. 43 Reinhold Niebuhr's pithy summary is still on
target. The ancient western world, including Plato and Aristotle,
emphasize[d] order, not only as the primary but
usually as the sole end of political life .... [They]
insisted on paying an excessive price in justice for
the sake of order, because the community and their
order was never secure in the internal cohesions of
the community and therefore depended upon an
undue emphasis upon the authority of the ruler and
upon the value of the boon of order which his
authority maintained.
The obvious difference of modern democratic
communities is that they insist on justice, rather than
order. 44
What Niebuhr attributed to democracy he could also have
ascribed to the biblical God.
In addition to substituting order for law, neo-cons
enjoin the familiar cant: "can" - power plus
opportunity - means "ought"-interest. With this
combination neo-con internationalists revive once
more the aristocratic impulse now globalized as an
imperial impulse. Subordinating justice to order once
again is an intolerable price to pay. The fourth
millstone! Truth be told, subordinating justice has
always been unsustainable as history time and again
teaches. So does the apostle, "God is not mocked." 45
Neo-con internationalists constantly counsel and practice
"resolve."46 "Resolve" is both a personal and a public character trait
that has become a key marker whereby neo-cons self-identify one to
another. They use numerous historical examples but none more
powerfully and revealingly than the example of the British Empire
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during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Briefly stated,
"the British lacked the will" to maintain, strengthen, and extend its
empire.H
Again, neo-con internationalists take their cue from Machiavelli.
Like his fellow Renaissance humanists Machiavelli retrieved an
ancient classic insight in order to gain wisdom for his own time. High
on the humanist agenda is the question of "fm1une." In the famous,
penultimate chapter of The Prince Machiavelli explo1=es how a prince
might possess Lady Fortune, literally, and thus be the successful
prince. It will not be easy; she is wild.
I compare her [Fortune] to one of those raging rivers
... everything flies before it, all yield to its violence,
without being able in any way to withstand it; and
yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow
therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair,
shall not make provision, both with defenses and
barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the
waters may pass away by canal, and their force be
neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it
happens with fortune, who shows her power where
valor has not prepared to resist her, and thither she
turns her forces where she knows that barriers and
defenses have not been raised to constrain her.4R
The successful prince must, when all else is said and done,
possess the virtue of manly valor in order to possess Lady Fortune.
Machiavelli makes his point with a violently erotic image - though,
surely, violence eclipses true eros.
I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful
and man steadfast in their ways so long as the two
are in agreement, men are successful, but
unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part 1
consider that it is better to be adventurous than
cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you
wish to keep her under, it is necessary to beat and illuse her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be
mastered by the adventurous rather than by those
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who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore,
always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because
they are less cautious, more violent, and with more
audacity command her. 49
Neo-cons discipline themselves toward manly "resolve" because
they know their three opponents - not to mention raging Lady
Fortune - are formidable, the three being international isolationists,
realist internationalists, and liberal internationalists. As in classic
aristocracy, neo-con moral resolve arrives with an epistemological
resolve rooted in superior knowledge and understanding. This erotics
of superior knowledge destines aristocrats, old and new, toward an
erotics of overwhelming power, of global empire; and vice versa. Our
theological vocation disciplines us to ask how the biblical God might
come in opposition. In parts six and seven we ask this pointedly in the
context of emerging publics of domestic and global civil society,
publics pitied if not despised by neo-aristocrats. Presently we will see
how "the Bush doctrine" within the comprehensive context of
implicit imperialism presses the President toward epistemological
resolve, toward a "no doubt presidency." 10

4. "The Bush Doctrine" as Implicit Imperialism
"The Bush doctrine," as neo-con internationalists affectionately call
it, integrates, indoctrinates, and executes the "much broader" vision
of neo-con internationalism.s1 President Bush did not possess "the
Bush doctrine" when he was elected in 2000. Neo-cons, of course,
knew that. Truth be told, the President was not elected as a neo-con;
neo-cons converted him, as they are well aware. When elected, he
was some pathetic combination of isolationist and realist
internationalist, according to neo-con lore, and on that they are right.
Neo-cons detest both, especially when wimpishly combined. "The
Bush doctrine" has steadily evolved since 9/1 1. Neo-con lore: after
9/1 1 neo-cons breathed into George W. "the Bush doctrine" and he
became a living President.
Nine/eleven traumatized the President. He, like every US citizen
and citizens throughout the world, was psychologically traumatized.
As President his trauma quickly surfaced at the visionary level of
international polity. His undisciplined diet of a little isolationism here
and a little realism there left him and the country impotent, incapable
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of responding, say the neo-cons. Neo-con internationalists saw this
clearly; indeed, they anticipated it. They immediately named the
"crisis" and seized the "opportunity." 5 ~ They convinced the President
that his trauma was a "crisis," doubly rooted, in his own faulty view
of the presidency - the President thought presidency was primarily
about domestic leadership - and in his own flabby vision of
international polity. It's the vision thing; and neo-cons knew the way
forward, implicit imperialism.
Neo-cons have been developing their comprehensive vision at
least since 1992 and had laid it out in 2000 in Present Dangers.~)
Neo-cons identify three periods that the US is going through on its
way toward realizing the imperial aspiration for "The New American
Century": (I) 1989 to 9/ 11 /2001, the period of "American confusion
and indecision"; (2) 911 1 to March 18, 2003, the day before the
invasion of Iraq, the period of "illusions destroyed"; (3) March 19,
2003, the invasion of Iraq, the period of "a new era of Pax
Americana."~ 4 Each period contains both a crisis and an opportunity.
Each period is a stage in the Empire's coming of age. And, each stage
of Empire depends of course on a parallel stage in the neo-cons' own
work agenda. Period one is preparation, period two is indoctrination,
and period three is execution. Prepare the comprehensive vision of
empire, indoctrinate the President to indoctrinate the nation in "the
Bush doctrine," and execute the empire, for the moment, as implicit
imperialism. The present moment, like the previous, will produce
crisis and thereby present opportunity. Readiness and resolve
comprise the neo-con discipline for The New American Century. The
next crisis will likely entail the opportunity for explicit empire. Neocons have made themselves the great influence. The King's
philosophers! Plato's "I Have a Dream."
The neo-con account of "the Bush doctrine" contains three
elements: active American global leadership, regime change, and
promotion of liberal democratic principles. 55 Note the words used:
"leadership," "promotion of democratic principles," even "regime
change." These words are purposefully conventional. The two
administrations prior to President George W. Bush's - the elder
Bush's administration and Clinton's administrations - had already
used these very terms. So what's the big deal, neo-cons routinely say
in public. Neo-cons have learned the lesson of 1992, and they have
honed their linguistic discipline accordingly. The true trinity of "the
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Bush doctrine" is: resolute unipolar hegemony, resolute preemptive
war realism, and resolute mercenary-benevolent-capitalism
(coalitions of the billing) - unshakeable building blocks of empire.
Neo-cons base this trinity on the cleavage between a domestic rule of
law and an international aristocratic ethos, as we have already seen.
In part six we will note how neo-cons root this cleavage in a peculiar
form of aristocratic democracy.
"The Bush doctrine" has developed in four stages. 56 First, on the
evening of September 11, 2001 the President vowed to a national and
international television audience to bring justice "to those who are
behind these evil acts" and to "those who harbored them." Second, in
his September 20, 2001 address to the US Congress, he noted that the
US is at war not only with particular terrorists but with terrorism itself,
with "every terrorist group of global reach ... [and with] nations that
provide aid or safe haven to terrorism." Third, on November 6, 200 I
he defined "our [US] mission and our moment" to the Warsaw
Conference on Combating Terrorism in this way: not only will the US
fight the evil of terrorism "until we're rid of it," but, "[w]e will not
wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass
destruction." This was the first time that the President placed the
question of weapons of mass destruction within the context of a
comprehensive war on terrorism. Also it was the first definitive,
though still embryonic, identification ofhis "doctrine of preemption."
The fourth stage of"the Bush doctrine" arrives in the President's
January 25, 2002 State of the Union address. This stage is the crucial
stage, "the completion" stage, of "the Bush doctrine."~ In this stage
three elements congeal and thus solidify "the Bush doctrine." The
President notes that the war has "two great objectives." The first is to
defeat terrorism. For neo-cons that's fine, but in itself defeating
terrorism is not "great." It is too small. In itself it is still "Americalite." Only the second of the President's "great objectives" is truly
"great." Only the second is "the true Bush doctrine": "to prevent
regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends
and allies with weapons of mass destruction." Prevent threats.
Prevent them whether imminent or not. And imminent or not, prevent
them in any way that is effective and efficient. Prevent threats is the
first element toward completion.
The President then identifies North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an
"axis of evil." The neo-cons:
7
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So much for our previous diplomatic efforts with
North Korea. So much for the claim that Iraq has
been successfully kept "in a box." So much for our
new "constructive" relationship with Iran. No. These
regimes constitute a growing danger, the president
asserted - breaking definitely with the complacency
of his predecessor and the wishfulness of his own
State Department.sR
Neo-cons consider Bush's "axis of evil" remark to go beyond the
mere identification of three "rogue states." It is a declared '"Axis of
Evil' doctrine."' 9 It has a teaching function. It teaches that in "the
unipolar era" the world is always self-evidently divisible between
good and evil. The good are those who are unquestioningly with us.
This renders everyone else against us, in effect accomplices of evil.
What is becoming clear is that even the so-called war on
terrorism is only a front, a stooge for empire. Evil is not even some
other real pole; evil is privation pure and simple, a depraved Jack of
recognition of unambiguous unipolarity, of "The American Century."
Evil is the un-real. Good-or-evil unipolarity is the second element of
the completion stage. Apocalypticism!
"Powell's Moment" signals the progress of"the Bush doctrine."
In neo-con chronology this refers to the week between February 2
and 9, 2002, when Secretary of State Colin Powell abandoned the
"dovish sensibilities" of "the Powell doctrine," which till then had
infested the George W. presidency as it had softened the first Bush
presidency a decade earlier. Being "a late convert to the Bush
doctrine," "ironically" makes Powell "its most effective proponent ....
Once deployed, Powell could be America's most formidable nonexploding weapon."r.<• This comes true exactly a year later when
Powell appears before the United Nations. Truly prescient!
Now the third element solidifYing the fourth stage of "the Bush
doctrine" appears. Resolve! Again, the President, January 25, 2002:
"The United States of America will not permit the world's most
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons." Neo-cons consider this "the most significant sentence
spoken by an American president in almost 20 years." 61 "Resolve"
pertains not just to one or another strategic plan or tactical
engagement; rather, it pertains to the comprehensive vision,
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indoctrination, and execution of implicit imperialism on the way to
the explicit empire of"The New American Century." Christened with
resolve "the Bush doctrine" actualizes neo-con expectations. "The
Bush doctrine" is complete; the indoctrination period culminates.
The enduring "doctrines" of unipolarity, preemption, evil axis,
and resolve place the crown on implicit imperialism. In September
2002 the President released The National Security Strategy of the
United States. This is "the Bush doctrine" as finished product. 61 "The
Bush doctrine" is no longer a mere collection of themes that the US
can prudentially take or leave depending on circumstance. Using the
categories of classic political philosophy, neo-cons have created - or
helped the President to create, whichever- "the Bush doctrine" as
both a "treatise" and a "tract."
A treatise decrees enduring, even timeless principles; a tract for
the times transmits the decrees to the appropriate audience.(,l As a
treatise The National Security Strategy is "the most significant US
foreign policy statement since NSC 68, the 1950 paper that codified
the containment doctrine." 64 As a treatise neo-cons aim only to extend
its global reach to encompass not just Afghanistan, at Qaeda, Iraq,
North Korea, and Iran, but also "Central Asia," "Southeast Asia"
especially Indonesia and the Philippines, "East Asia" especially
China, and not to forget "the Balkans" and "the Sinai."MNeo-cons
compare US unipolarity to that enjoyed by history's grandest empires
-the Roman Empire, the Persian Empire, Charlemagne's Empire, the
Chinese Empire, the British Empire and then conclude: "no
comparison."66 US unipolarization can and thereby ought to surpass
every previous empire.
Neo-cons proudly declare that "the Bush doctrine"
entails "quite a change from US tradition." 67 Again,
note the linguistic discipline, "quite a change."
Indeed! "The Bush doctrine" erodes the gathering
consensus of US nonnative tradition, though an
imperial attitude has always had hold claimed a hold,
and it cuts against US normative patriotism/'' Having
successfully breathed "the Bush doctrine," neo-cons
have only to compose a tract-for-the-times. This
includes securing the financial funding - big-time
funding - for "the Bush doctrine's" "bold new
course." 69
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We have already located Machiavelli's unrivaled, overwhelming
power - the lion - in the neo-con, aristocratic moral rationale for
hegemonic, unipolar power and seen it enthroned in "the Bush
doctrine." We have also located Machiavelli's deception - the fox in neo-con aristocratic morality and have seen it embodied in the neocon linguistic discipline of systemic deception. Now we can
accurately locate the other trait ofMachiavelli's fox, its "secrecy," the
loyal twin of deception. Systematic deception functions in public
arenas. It habitually disseminates misinformation. Further, when
publics do discern truth, disseminators resolutely claim that the
disinformation is merely misinformation. This erodes public trust and
inhibits public accountability. "Secrecy" functions publicly to hide
the personal life and character of a public person, in our case, the
person of the President. Secrecy, then, is different from privacy,
which public persons need and to which they have a right.
Machiavelli counsels.
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to haye all
the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very
necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to
say this also, that to have them and always to observe
them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is
useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane,
religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so
framed that should you require not to be so, you may
be able and know how to change to the opposite ....
For this reason a prince ought to take care that he
never lets anything slip from his lips that is not
replete with the above-named five qualities, that he
may appear to him who sees and hears him
altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and
religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear
to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge
generally more by the eye than by the hand, because
it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in
touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to
be, few really know what you are, and those few dare
not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many,
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who have the majesty of the state to defend them;
and in the actions of all men, and especially of
princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one
judges by the result.711

An irony arises when secrecy meets US public life, and
Machiavelli could not have anticipated it. US normative patriotism
rejects the aristocratic ethos. Emma Lazarus poetically engraved this
refusal on the Statue of Liberty in the first words spoken by the
Mother ofExiles.
Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp.
In this refusal the Mother of Exiles is emphatically
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
with conquering limbs astride from land to land. 71
In part six we will explore the preferred horizon that Lazarus
illuminates. For now it is enough to observe that public persons
regularly elect not to appear aristocratic, especially if they really are the heightened publicity of a president intensifies this choice.
Aristocrats conceal themselves. President Bush does this with aplomb.
The President intentionally and effortlessly lives a double life. In
public he emphasizes his "aw shucks" persona and does so in two
prominent ways. First, as a Texas cowboy, he appears about as
"common" as one can get in a country steeped in cowboy lore.
Second, he speaks with a strong evangelical Christian accent - often
modulating fundamentalist and Pentecostal accents as well - that
appeals to the middle, even working, class. For instance, he skillfully
employs the one discourse that unites the otherwise quite different
accents found in Christian evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and
Pentecostalism: the discourse of"l once was morally lost but now am
morally sound." The President occasionally plays up his background
in major league baseball, "America's pastime." But the reputation of
billionaire owners renders that persona too precarious. Notice, he
never publicly trumpets his oil persona!
Now comes the secrecy. Behind the doors that close off the US
public from his aristocratic kin and ken, the President readily presents
and practices his full aristocratic credentials.n Here we have the sheer
reverse of the "double consciousness" that African-Americans
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learned in order to survive slavery and continued to practice with
aplomb long after legalized slavery ended.' 1

5. The Iraq War as Execution of Empire - Implicitly,
Explicitly
Neo-cons invented the Iraq War. They invented it long before 9/ 11.
That is, they invented, even created, its comprehensive purpose and
meaning.' 4 They did this during the preparation period, chronicled
above. Only since the crisis of 9/ 11 did the opportunity arise to vest
the President and US publics with their invention. Their invention?
The Iraq War as the Empire's first strike and its first outpost. This is
what neo-cons mean by "taking the [Iraq] war beyond terrorism."' 5
Under linguistic discipline the President would not, however,
present the explicit imperialist invention to US or global publics. He
offered, instead, an imminent threat rationale that would sound
plausible within the just war tradition's moral criteria. Futther, as
neo-cons imagined, and likely planned, he sent Secretary of State
Colin Powell, "America's most formidable non-exploding weapon"
to make it happen.
Armed with epistemological resolve Secretary Powell
admonished the world on February 5, 2003. "The gravity of this
moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly
weapons programs and describe why they are real and present
dangers to the region and to the world." 76 Numerous other US
officials, each a prominent neo-con, had made similar assertions prior
to Powell's. 77 On October 7, 2002 the President said in a speech in
Cincinnati, OH: "The danger is already significant and it only grows
worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous
weapons today - and we do - does it make any sense for the world to
wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even
more dangerous weapons?" Even after the invasion the President said
in May 2003 in Poland, "We found the weapons of mass destruction.
You know, we found biological weapons." Neo-con George F. Will
calls such remarks "accumulating errors ... [due to] "rhetorical
carelessness and overreaching." 7 ~ "Overreaching"? Indeed, as in
Empire. "Rhetorical carelessness"? Not so! Empire begets
epistemological resolve. Is it true, Mr. Will, that foxes never blink?
Empire breeds systemic deception.
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Oh, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive!

Prior to the invasion many who opposed the Iraq War knew of the
neo-con invention and contested it accordingly. Others opposed the
War because it did not meet "just war tradition" moral criteria like
just cause and/or last resort. Numerous events beginning especially in
January 2004 have increasingly exposed the Iraq War for what it has
always been, the prototype invention of implicit imperialism. The
absence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction after the intensive,
nine-month search has sent neo-cons scrambling to paste together a
new "moral" justification for the War. In reality it appears that neocons will invent numerous rationales and flood the public with
several at a time; cats, and foxes, are famously difficult to corral.
Some War apologists simply deceive by denying that the
President ever justified the War because of an imminent threat of
WMD. 79 The President never used the phrase "imminent threat," they
say with the churlish delight of sophomores with crossed fingers
behind their backs. This blatant deception approach is then followed
with a host of other items that supposedly were the real sufficient
reasons given by the President. These apologists cite eleven reasons:
Saddam 1) twice invaded his neighbors, 2) used chemical weapons to
commit genocide against the Iraqi Kurds, 3) ethnically cleansed the
Marsh Arabs, 4) maintained terrorist training camps, 5) tried to
assassinate a former US president, 6) threatened to take revenge on
America, 7) was shooting at American aircraft over Iraq's "no-fly"
zones, 8) was sending money to Palestinian terrorists, 9) had violated
more than a dozen U.N. resolutions agreed to in exchange for the
1991 cease fire, 10) forced out U.N. weapons inspectors, and II)
convinced "every major intelligence service in the world ... that he
was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction." 80
Apparently, Saddam convinced them by patently telling them that he
did not have WMD. Furthermore, the eleventh rationale is simply
false; there were major intelligence services decidedly and vocally
not convinced.
Since January 2004 other War apologists are publicly
propagating a justification for the war that has nothing to do with
weapons of mass destruction and little to do with that laundry list of
Saddam mad-man items, though these apologists may also include
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some of those items ad hoc. This new public rationale is actually the
originally invented rationale, never publicly declared due to neo-con
linguistic discipline. Ironically, this War apologetic exposes the Iraq
War for what it has always been, that is, the neo-con prototype of
Empire, implicit imperialism. In his 2004 State of the Union Address
the President himself used this new War apologetic. This innovative
rationale is quite different from the justification argued in his 2003
State of the Union Address.
The 2004 justification goes like this. "Because of American
leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better." Notice
the neo-con identity marker "resolve." Notice, too, the strict
linguistic discipline regarding "leadership." Neo-cons know this
means "imperial hegemony." In neo-con discourse the President is
saying that "the world is changing for the better" because of"the Pax
Americana," "The New American Century." The President
immediately follows up "changing for the better" by pointing to
Libya's recent pledge to disclose and dismantle its weapons of mass
destruction. The Iraq War is and always has been about "sending a
message." The President again, "For diplomacy to be effective, words
must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America." 81
Hegemonic theorists, who study the ways of effective and
efficient empires, know that an empire, especially during a nascent
and more implicit phase, must learn to "send a message."
Maintaining and expanding an empire is costly, both from an
economic perspective and from a domestic and international public
opinion perspective. War intervals are especially costly and
precarious in both ways.~ 2 Effective empires must increase their
efficiencies by well-timed, properly planned and publicized events of
"shock and awe." A "shock and awe" message "heard 'round the
world" is the efficiently effective way to put the world on alert. The
President's War does not put only terrorists and "rogue nations," who
might aid and abet terrorists, on alert. Remember, neo-cons readily
take the War beyond tetTorism. Rather, the President's War puts
everyone on alert, anyone who is not totally, uncritically with the
empire stands against the empire. This is what the world famous
"freedom fries" humbug is all about. This is what the President means
by "no one can now doubt the word of America." 83 This is why
imperialism and war realism are the identical twins that habitually
execute wars of desire as normal politics. The President's rhetoric
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strategy in the 2004 State of the Union Address is well-known. He
intentionally employs a classic fallacy of logic, which every highschool student who has ever taken Debate 101 and Logic 101 learns:
post hoc, ergo, propter hoc - "after this, therefore, because of this."
After the Iraq War, therefore, because of the Iraq War! Neo-con
discourse will credit the President's "leadership and resolve" - really
their own superior understanding and character - for every
economically, morally and politically desirable outcome from here to
eternity. We will be treated with a never-ending, progressively
ascending, slippery slope of wonderful consequences. In these ways
empire is "strategically sound and morally right."R4 We must restore
debate and logic to our core curriculums.
Neo-cons routinely counter the public disapproval of the War's
imperialist meanings in one of three ways, or in some combination.
First, neo-cons advise stonewalling though this regularly backfires
with global and US publics. Second, they employ classic "red
herring" linguistic practices. A bucket of red herrings has always
been effective. Neo-cons throw out one or another of the War's
possible many, minor meanings, which we cited earlier. These many
meanings, each likely containing an element of truth, are
epiphenomena, i.e., side issues, in comparison with Iraq's
comprehensive meaning. Like the "red herring," these side issues
bear less weight but yield big smells. Practiced bloodhounds
recognize the big smell for what it is and refuse to be distracted from
the critical pursuit. Neo-cons also use creative combinations. Third,
as already noted, they practice delicate linguistic discipline.
Dismantling stone walls, eluding red herrings, and discerning the
linguistic discipline of implicit imperialism are tough but terribly
important tasks, which critics of the War's imperialist meanings must
maintain. It takes resolve. This prophetic resolve is not based,
however, in re-masculinized violence but is rooted in the hope of a
deliberative ethos.85
Finally, neo-cons expertly co-opt "multilateral" internationalists
for the neo-con creation. This is a key strategy for ending "the battle
between American primacy and multipolarity, [which] is nearing an
end - and what is to come is a world that no one ever imagined," "an
enduring Pax Americana."86 Thomas Friedman, well-known
columnist at the New York Times, is a good case study. In an editorial,
Friedman laments the "dichotomy" between the National Football
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League's "frivolous and gross" 2004 Super Bowl and the ongoing
War in which soldiers continually die daily bearing the whole burden
themselves. 117 How can the US be "just sailing along" normally?
Friedman continues his scold. "And what bothers me ever more
is that this dichotomy is exactly what the Bush team wants." Well, of
course, Mr. Friedman. At the heart of neo-con logic is that the US is
no longer a "normal nation" as normally conceived. Rather, neo-cons
passionately - erotically - desire that the US be a nonnal Empire,
actually to be the normative Empire by which any future empire must
be normed. This "dichotomy" is imperially normal and normative.
While Friedman continues as he has in the past to criticize "the
antiwar left," no matter "how mangled was the Bush road to war," he
holds his harshest criticism for "the Bush conservatives." The War
"can't be won with an 'idealism' that is selfish, greedy, arrogant,
incapable of self-criticism and believing that all that matters is our
will and power and nothing else." Friedman deludes himself by
thinking that he could prescribe just one additional ingredient,
something "else," that would balance out, or absorb, or some such, all
those other foibles.
Friedman's something "else" is multilateralism, multipolarity.
"We can defeat Saddam alone. But we can't build a decent political
center alone. We don't have enough legitimacy or staying power. We
need to enlist all our allies - including France, Germany and the U.N.
Security Council - in this titanic struggle." Friedman calls this "the
great mistake of the neo-cons and this administration." First, the
elements in his list - in itself an accurate enough listing - are not
merely unfortunate foibles accidentally attached to neo-con
internationalism; these elements are its substance. Friedman's list is
neo-con imperialism, heart and soul. Second, neo-cons have already
ingested and digested Friedman's other ingredient, his something
"else." How is this so?
Neo-cons call it, "multilateralism, American style. " 88 "Most
American multilateralists are unilateralists at the core." They call this
the "quintessentially American view." Neo-cons think that the US
should always seek to "enlist" - the tenn Friedman uses - as many
allies as possible, even the United Nations, on any issue we want to.
This is the vaunted coalition of the willing. Routinely, however, the
willing looks more like a coalition of the billing - nations whose
economic bills the US promises to pay off. No matter the outcome of
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this enlisting, "we'll do what we want." The neo-con creation of
"American multilateralism" is not "a principled multilateralism" tied
to "an international legal order." The latter vision belonged to
President Clinton, the target of neo-con derision.
As we have seen, neo-cons reject an international rule of law as
the first commandment ofneo-con internationalism. This makes them
"instrumental internationalists," "pragmatic internationalists," as
they argue. Neo-con multilateralists employ "a cost-benefit analysis,
not a principled commitment to multilateral action as the cornerstone
of world order."
"In an age of American hegemony, it will be multilateralism,
American style," say the neo-cons. They speak a rhetoric of
multilateral ism, actually a "blend of unilateral ism and multilateralism
[which] reflects," they claim, "a broad and deep American
consensus." Their "multilateralism" remakes the US in their own
image. Internationally, neo-cons desire "a government of men" not
"of law," a world of 'the man,' not a world 'of law.' This reverses US
normative patriotism. The difference between instrumental
internationalism and principled internationalism is not one of style
but of substance. Neo-cons know this, despite the cutesy, pop T.V.
allusion. Instrumental internationalists are principled imperialists.
The cloak is foxy; don't you think, Mr. Friedman?
Rejecting the rule of law leads neo-cons to imperialism and war
realism. The just war tradition fits the world of law. Indeed,
historically the just war tradition has propelled the Western world
toward an international rule of law. For neo-con internationalists the
just war tradition is just one more thing to instrumentalize. They will
use just war criteria when it suits them and they will dispose of just
war criteria when the criteria are a nuisance.
Neo-cons use the just war tradition as they use multilateral ism, as
just so much cover. The biblical "not in vain" command - the Second
Commandment as Lutherans number them - prohibits blasphemy,
prohibits defaming God's name, God's fame, God's character. That
is, it prohibits taking something that is Godly and using it as cover, as
a cloak. On the political level the Second Commandment demands
truth not deception; on the moral level candor not craft; on the
theological level repentance not denial, honour not blasphemy.
Just war tradition apologists, as am I and as is the Lutheran
heritage, must expose instrumentalizing a Godly tradition. The
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President said, "I am a war president."R Just war presidents, too, can
be saved! 90 Neo-cons, however, have breathed "the Bush doctrine"
into the President and he has become a living, war-realist, an implicit
imperialist. A more Godly case can be made for a different US
internationalism.

6. Deliberative Democracy and Emerging Civil Society
Neo-con discipleship prods US and international publics "to stop
worrying and love the Pax Americana."91 I urge a different
international discipleship. This different discipleship can be, and is,
rooted in numerous religious and non-religious traditions. Though
not uniquely Christian it is characteristically Christian and
characteristically Lutheran. In its characteristically Lutheran form it
begins by acknowledging that the biblical God creatively continues to
call things into being (Rom 4: 17). Beginning thus, Christians seek to
discern where and how and for what purposes the triune God is
bringing new things into being, new natural, social, and political
realities. Indeed, God commands people, all people, to honour God
precisely in these worldly places and ways and purposes. 92
Can we imagine a different international discipleship in which
God is bringing an emerging global civil society into social and
political being? Can we honour God by critically participating in this
emerging international phenomenon? To make this different
discipleship plausible for Christians, indeed, for anyone, we will
explore what we mean by an emerging global civil society and how
it contributes to the Godly character of international life. This will
provide a warrant for our claim that God is against empire creating,
instead, a preferential option for a civic internationalist ethos. Only a
sketch is possible in this essay.
Like many before and after him, Martin Luther, too, addressed
Plutarch's "Who, then, shall rule the ruler?" 91 Luther, also, said "law."
For Luther, however, law is always God's just law. Luther's
theological question, then, is how God holds rulers accountable to
God's law of justice. Rulers, as Luther was quite sure, sometimes
(perhaps often) do whatever they please; and what they fancy does
not always, perhaps not often, conform to God's just law. What, then,
are God's this-worldly media for ruling the ruler?
Luther discerned four- more like three and a half- this-worldly
media. First, there are "God's extraordinary leaders." 94 Sometimes
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these "extraordinary leaders" are themselves political rulers; often
times they are not. They have "a special star before God" and are not
so much trained or made as "created" and taught directly by God.
They possess a special endowment of "natural law and natural
reason." God raises up "such jewels, when, where, and to whom He
pleases" "not only among His own people but also among the godless
and the heathen; and not only in the ranks of the nobility but also
among the middle classes, farmers, and laborers."
Luther's second this-worldly medium of God's rule ofthe rulers
is the "office" of "a preacher by whom God rebukes" political rulers.
They are to exercise the wide admonitory power of the preaching
office "uprightly and honestly," "openly and boldly."9 ; This
admonitory duty of the preaching office is "not seditious," but "on the
contrary a praiseworthy, noble, and rare virtue, and a particularly
great service to God." In many treatises Luther himself consciously
exercised the admonitory power of his office.
A third medium is external enemies. God can use a ruler's
external enemies in order to hold a ruler accountable to God's just
law. God even uses external enemies who themselves do not practice
justice in order to rule an unjust ruler, a sort of medium of last resort
on God's part. The aggressive Turkish army under Suleiman the
Magnificent was Luther's contemporary instance. Because the Holy
Roman Empire, including the German people, practiced injustice and
persecuted the gospel, "the Turk ... is God's rod and the devil's
servant [Is 10:5]; there is no doubt about that." 96 "God has mastered
the art of punishing one thief by means of another," also in the
political arena. 97
Luther identifies - rather, intuits - a fourth this-worldly
medium through which God rules the rulers. Addressing his own
soon-to-be prince Luther notes, "The common man [sic] is learning
to think." 98 He takes this as a political hermeneutic for interpreting
Psalm I 07:40 "God pours contempt upon princes." The common
people of his time were acquiring the necessary capacities for moral
and political reflection about the public world of political rule.
"Men will not, men cannot, men refuse to endure your tyranny and
wantonness much longer. Dear princes and lords be wise and guide
yourselves accordingly. God will no longer tolerate it. The world is
no longer what it once was, when you hunted and drove the people
like game."
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Luther's world was changing as the moral and political capacity
of common people was changing. This impressed Luther and thus he
advised rulers, "therefore, no man is to be despised, [for God] once
spoke through the mouth of an ass [Num. 22:28]."99 Luther, of course,
could not imagine any enduring medium capable of institutionalizing
his intuition. Biblical and historical precedent and his personal
experience were the sources of his intuition. The best he could do was
to urge rulers to develop the personal virtue of seeking moral wisdom
in common people. Only one of Luther's three and a half media of
divine accountability was institutionalized, was an "office." The
extra-ordinary leaders, the external enemies, and the nascent political
capacities of common people were all ad hoc media, random acts of
divine accountability, one might say. Luther's access to Plutarch's
question likely came through his reading of Cicero, also a likely
source for his intuition regarding common people's political capacity.
Cicero ( 106-43 BC) had examined these questions over a century
before Plutarch. Cicero, like Aristotle before him, identified three
basic forms of rule: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy
(republic). 1110 Each has strengths and weaknesses, though a democracy
"is the least to be preferred" and a monarchy "is far the best." 10 1
Cicero really prefers a fourth form, "a mean and a mixture" of the
previous three, enshrined in a written constitution. 102 The constitution
was a mechanism with weights and counter-weights. But a state,
according to Cicero, is more than a machine; it is a living being
directed by spirit. The spirit is the public opinion of all the classes of
people together. Cicero's problem comes at this point and he is quite
aware of it. In his day there was no medium for public opinion, for
the formation, testing, and reformation of spirit. There was no press,
no "fourth estate" as the eighteenth century would come to call it. The
growth of news media in the eighteenth century was socially and
politically revolutionary because it initiated a democratic public
sphere. w1 This made possible what Cicero could merely imagine but
not pull off. That was left to the US founders with much help from
their many thoughtful forerunners.
We come to the story of constitutional democracy and its three
forms: aristocratic-republic, liberal, and deliberative. 104 Historically
the aristocratic-republic form goes back to ancient Rome at least. Its
communitarian and aristocratic shape influenced certain streams of
the US founders. In this form the virtuous, organically homogenous
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community precedes the state and the constitution's purpose is to
ensure that the state as a whole becomes virtuous. Therefore, the
constitution must especially guarantee that the trustees of community
vittue are enabled to train both the young and the 'fallen' citizenry in
the ways of the virtuous community.
The liberal form is often associated with John Locke- though not
exclusively - who stressed the rights of individuals. In this fotm the
constitution's purpose is to establish and protect well-defined zones
of privacy where individual citizens are free from state coercion and
protected from communal compulsion. In this more atomistic model
individuals are free to own private property, enter into contracts to
increase property, and generally to determine one's own life plans
according to private choice as long as this does not prohibit others
from doing the same. The prime mandate in the liberal fonn of
democracy is the constraint of neutrality. Never disagree in public
about the things that are morally most important. Keeping our really
big ethical disagreements private, especially those with an obvious
religious timbre, promotes tolerance.
These two forms of the democratic constitutional state have
remained in tension throughout US history. Each has been
accompanied by a "third sector," as it is often called. The third sector
is that sector of public life that is neither the constitutional state nor
the economic market, sectors one and two in whichever order. The
third sector is simply "numbered" because its purposes and functions
remain fluid. In fact, the third sector's purposes and functions depend
on which form of democracy it is paired with. When paired with the
aristocratic-republic model the third sector entails institutions that
mediate - mediating institutions - communitarian virtues. This
certainly involves forming the virtues of the young. It likewise
involves forming the virtues of the domestic and immigrant masses,
especially the workplace virtues of the laboring classes. Mediating
institutions provide the advantaged class with opportunities to do
works of mercy and otherwise offer charity to those who have
"fallen" through the cracks of the economic system or who have
"fallen" on bad fortune. The offer of charity also goes to those who
have "fallen" victim to their own vices and who desire to amend their
lives. This latter form of charity fulfills the highest obligation of the
virtuous because it meets the greatest need of the fallen. It is the
charity most esteemed and therefore most pursued.
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In the liberal form of constitutional democracy the third sector is
composed of voluntary associations with different purposes and
functions. In the liberal model the third sector may also provide
safety-net services and opportunities for charity as indicated above.
But the third sector has two loftier purposes. First, it functions as a
border, so to speak, clearly partitioning public and private spheres.
Voluntary associations that specialize in maintaining the partition
receive the highest regard. Second, voluntary associations proliferate,
which aim to refresh and enhance the well-being of private
individuals who regularly get worn down in the grind of the economy
and of life in general. Within the liberal form voluntary associations
aim to be havens in an otherwise heartless world. This purpose covers
the waterfront of body, mind, and spirit.
The deliberative form of constitutional democracy embodies a
communicative ethos, different from the private-choice focus of the
liberal form or the virtue-training focus of the aristocratic-republic
fonn. The communicative focus of the deliberative form highlights the
public reasoning of all citizens who continuously speak together for
the purposes of coming to mutual understanding, just law, and public
action. Paired with deliberative democracy the third sector has a
primary purpose different from the purposes served within the other
two forms, though without excluding those purposes. With the
deliberative form the third sector locates, indeed, embodies a citizenry
of communicative reasoning. Only with deliberative democracy does
the third sector emerge as "civil society." Or, perhaps a better way to
put it, a gradually prevailing communicative ethos transforms the third
sector into "civil society," and this transformation brings about a more
deliberative form ofthe democratic constitutional state.
Deliberative democracy takes key elements from both the
aristocratic-republic and the liberal forms. It, then, roots these
elements in the richer soil of everyday speech and conversation. Like
the aristocratic-republic form, deliberative democracy gives center
stage to the political formation of public moral opinion. In this way
deliberative democracy invests the political process with ethical
connotations more robust than found in the liberal model but with
less communal homogeneity and paternalism than found in the
aristocratic-republic form.
Like the liberal and unlike the aristocratic-republic, however,
deliberative democracy also prioritizes the equal rights of citizens to
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participate n the political formation of public moral-ethical opinion.
This priority includes the corresponding participatory procedures.
Not only must political decision-makers be political consequencetakers, but also political consequence-takers must be political
decision-makers. The equal right of citizen participation implies the
equal obligation of citizens to participate. Indeed, how deliberative
democracy obligates its citizens to pa11icipate politically is crucial!
Deliberative democracy obligates citizen participation by providing
an economic, political, and humane infrastructure at least minimally
sufficient to sustain all citizens for participation.
Finally, deliberative democracy prioritizes a circulation of
political power that is vigorously open to a third sector now
communicatively transformed into civil society. First, it is important
to note that the word "civil" in civil society does not mean
"civilized," as in a civilized society. "Civil" also does not here mean
the virtue called "civility" as in "a society that practices civility." It is
true that from time to time people use the phrase "civil society" with
those meanings. And, certainly, there is nothing wrong with
"civility." Generally speaking, when a major newspaper, for instance,
uses the term "civil society," it is a sociological and political
category.
Civil society is a component of the general architecture, so to
speak, of public life. Civil society is that great plurality of
movements, associations, and institutions which emerges out of the
everyday life of citizens and residents for the prevention and
promotion of this, that, and the other thing. In this way civil society
is a public threshold that in one direction mingles and overlaps with
the less public sides of life. As a public threshold in the other
direction civil society mingles and overlaps with the great systems of
the market economy and the political state. Here we can look only at
the overlap with the political state.
Because civil society is this two-sided threshold, its preferential
purpose in a deliberative democracy is to be a "sleuth" comprised of
citizens attaining moral wisdom by reasoning together about
problems encountered, opportunities presented, obligations faced,
and rights required. Civil society's purpose in a deliberative
democracy is to be a "sluice" for circulating moral wisdom
concerning common goods into the political spheres of the
legislative, executive, and judicial workings of the state. These
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2

God Against Empire

45

preferential purposes of sleuth and sluice can also encompass
purposes which the third sector held within the aristocratic-republic
and liberal fonns of democracy.
Within deliberative democracy civil society's preferential
purposes involve citizens in the public work of ethics. The historic
co-emergence of civil society and deliberative democracy addresses
Plutarch's question in a fashion that Cicero could only faintly intuit.
Abraham Lincoln's digest of deliberative democracy as "government
of the people, by the people, for the people" remains provocative still
today. '"5 Lincoln knew monarchy as government "for" the people. He
knew aristocracy as government "of" and "for" the people. He
experienced democracy as government "of, by, and for" the people.
The "by" is the constant feedback loop testing, strengthening, and
refonning the "of," and deliberating the entire range of goods needed
"for" all the people to be "We, the people." In this experience he
understood the "by" as the deliberative reality that encompassed his
own life from the Kentucky log cabin to the US legislature, to the
Washington White House, to the Gettysburg graveyard.
Lincoln understood the "by" as the deliberative reality of equality
that must embrace the public life of these United States of America.
Emma Lazarus would indelibly inscribe this reality in her famed
words:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.
Aristocrats, ignoring Liberty's rebuke of "storied pomp,"
regularly mouth these words, sensing mostly the need for workers in
the fields and the factories and the markets. '06 Despite her aristocratic
upbringing, Lazarus knew, because she had been a frequent victim of
anti-Semitism, that only Lincoln's egalitarian "by" could satisfy that
"yearning to breathe free."
Lincoln was America's public theologian, many say our greatest.
It comes as no surprise, then, that immediately prior to his famous
democratic digest Lincoln invoked God to deliver "a new birth" of
precisely such a government of, by, for the people. Lincoln, too, knew
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Cicero, and he was quite aware of monarchist, aristocrat, and
imperialist renunciations of Cicero's vox populi est vox dei. 107 Yet, he
was neither persuaded nor deterred. He simply thought that
monarchists, aristocrats, and imperialists were theologically hard of
hearing. He believed the biblical God capable of delivering new birth
and he discerned in the still small voice of the people the voice of the
living God. God does not grant new births in vain, thought Lincoln.
Therefore, a deliberating people is God's preferred future for
mediating just law; it ought "not perish from the earth." 10R What was
barely conceivable for Cicero and only randomly perceivable by
Luther became normatively operable in Lincoln.

7. Honouring God in Global Civil Society
If, indeed, God is creatively working moral wisdom in the sleuthing
and sluicing purposes of civil society and deliberative democracy,
then we have a warrant for posing our claim. The biblical God is
against empire and for something else, for a nascent international rule
of law emerging in and with global civil society} 09
Early signs of global civil society include the burgeoning nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Christians and Lutherans have
for some time been in full communion with NGOs and INGOs. Note,
however, the negative identity! We know what they are not; do we
know what they are, what purpose they have? Their non character
mirrors the anonymity of the so-called "third" sector. The
transformation of the "third" sector into civil society has come about
for various reasons. A chief reason was their coming to purpose, to
public ethical purpose.
Civil society emerged with vigor during the 1980s and 1990s, in
Eastern Europe with the coming of Solidarity in Poland and ofVaclav
Havel's movement in Czechoslovakia; and in South Africa with
Mandela's movement, among others. Not surprisingly there has often
been a churchly dimension in the mix. When these ethical movements
come to public purpose, they develop and expand rapidly. The
ensuing transformation to civil society spread to the West, including
the US. No wonder neo-cons have now established NGOWatch. 110
Neo-con internationalists are worried because global civil society
will alter nation-state sovereignty.l 11 They are vexed because global
civil society introduces an international deliberative ethos. They are
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epistemologically resolute because global civil society subverts
America's benevolent global hegemony. Neo-cons will not give up
on The New American Century, on the Empire.
Will the transformation of INGOs into global civil society bring
with it an institutionalizing thrust toward an enduring and principled
international rule of law? There are numerous complex questions
beyond what we can investigate here. The nature of national
sovereignty looms large. What kind of"civic internationalism" might
emerge? Likely, some deliberative form of democracy will be in the
international mix. That is, of course, if the world does not devolve
into the new era of empire, being dreamed and it to be deliberated as
publicly as possible.
In which ways both randomly and regularly will God
rule the rulers? What future might God initiate
through churchly engagement in global civil society?
What ecclesial forms will serve this critical
participation? How will Christians honour God in
global civil society?
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1898 at www.fordham.edu/halsall/modll 898beveridge.html (this is the
speech which made Beveridge famous; and "In Support of an American
Empire," Congressional Record, 56tt' Congress, 1" session, pp. 704-712.
(1900); and "The Star of Empire," September 25, 1900, in God's New
Israel: Religious Inte1pretations of American Destiny, ed. Conrad
Cherry (Chapel Hill, NC: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998), pp.
146-159. In this last essay Beveridge argues that the moral , "benevolent
colonial" rationale for empire surpasses by encompassing the imperial
rationales of territory, economy, and human nature, these latter three all
containing important truths, notes Beveridge.

16

Niebuhr, Nations and Empires, p. 28. However one assesses Niebuhr 's
Christian realism, reading his extensive critical analysis of empire is
well worth the effort. What is particularly missing in the 1950s of
Niebuhr's time is the emergent global civil society that we will describe
in parts six and seven below and its critical contribution to any inquiry
regarding empire.

17

Paul Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," in Kagan and
Kristol, Present Dangers, pp. 312, 314. Wolfowitz, as Assistant
Secretary of Defense under the first President Bush, was third in
command at the Pentagon, and now, as Deputy Secretary of Defense in
President George W. Bush's administration, is second in command at
the Pentagon. G. John Ikenberry, Peter F. Krogh Professor of
Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University, has concisely
and insightfully articulated seven elements that form the neo-con
internationalist "new grand strategy" (see Ikenberry, "America's
Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81.5 [Sept-Oct, 2002]: 44ff.). I
base my exposition of neo-con internationalism on my reading of
Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers as well as other resources at
Project for the New American Centwy, pp. 312-314. Ikenberry does not
cite Present Dangers and he does not offer any footnoted references.

I&

Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "Introduction: National Interest and
Global Responsibility," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers; page
numbers in my text refer to that essay.

George Will, "Democrats are learning what doesn't work," Washington
Post, Jan. 28, 2004. Will draws from Carnes Lord's - of the US Naval
War College - analysis of the moribund feminization of politics coming
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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from a combination of numerous factors, including "the egalitarian,
anti-hierarchical spirit of the age;" see Carnes Lord, The Modern
Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now (New Haven, CN, 2003).
This is the theme of William J. Bennett's "Morality, Character and
American Foreign Policy," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers, pp.
289-306; and of Donald Kagan's "Strength and Will: A Historical
Perspective," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers. pp. 337-362.
George Will's recommendation to read Lord's The Modern Prince
steers us to explore Niccolo Machiavelli's classic, The Prince. in order
to get a better grasp of neo-con implicit imperialism.
Kagan and Kristol, "Introduction," p. 24. In international political
philosophy William Wohlforth, a noted "hegemonic theorist" developed
the warrants for a unipolar world in "The Stability of a Unipolar World,
International Security, 24.1 (Summer 1999): 5-41. Kagan and Kristol
cite him favorably ("Introduction," p. 22). Thomas Donnelly, fonnerly
Deputy Executive Director of Project for the New American Centlll)'
and presently Resident Fellow at American Enterprise Institute, calls
Wohlforth 's hegemonic theory "ground breaking" (see, Donnelly,
"Brave New World: An Enduring Pax Americana," National Security
Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, April I, 2003 at
www.aei.ori/publications/pub!D.1671 0/pub detail. asp).
11

James W. Caesar, "The Great Divide," in Kagan and Kristol, Present
Dangers, pp. 27, 27, 23. Caesar sets out the comprehensive scope of the
neo-cons' embryonic empire just beneath the veneer of implicit
imperialism.
The significant and complex question of the neo-con market economy
lies beyond the scope ofthis essay.
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334. For the neocon critique of "idealist" internationalism see Kagan and Kristol,
"Introduction," pp. 22-24, 28-32,
Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334.
See Plutarch, "To an Uneducated Ruler," in Mora/ia, vol. 10, par. 780,
trans. H. Fowler, in Loeb Classic LibraiJ' (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1960).
John Adams inscribed this criterion in the opening clause of the original
draft of the Massachusetts' Constitution ( 1779).

17

Plutarch's stunning imperialist argument is:
But if he [the real statesman] were given the choice among
governments [monarchy, aristocracy, democracy], like so many
tools, he would follow Plato's advice and choose no other than

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004

52

Consensus
monarchy, the only one which is able to sustain that top note of
viltue, high in the highest sense, and never let it be tuned down
under compulsion or expediency. For the other forms of
government in a certain sense, although controlled by the
statesman, control him, and although carried along by him, carry
him along, since he has no finnly established strength to oppose
those from whom his strength is derived, but is often compelled to
exclaim in the words of Aeschylus which Demetrius the Citystonner employed against Fortune after he had lost his hegemony,
"Thou fanst my flame, I methinks thou bumst me up."
See "On Monarch, Democracy, and Oligarchy," in Moralia, op. cit., par.
827. Plutarch believes that the contingencies of Fortune, which spark
the desire for Fame, always threaten death - "bumst me up" - and this
belief leads Plutarch to pursue superior "control."

28

Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 334.
Ibid., p. 334-5.

)0

Ibid., p. 335.

l l

Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich
investigate the systemic deception that has been perpetrated regarding
the weapons of mass destruction justification for the 2003-03 Iraq War
in WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004) at:
www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/irar;Jintell/home.htm.

32

Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 41. Quotations in this paragraph come
from p. 41.

ll

Max Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"' The Washington Post,
October 14, 2004 at www. newamerjcanceotucy. or~/ irag-1 0 1402.htm.
Accounts of this incident are legion. Neo-con accounts are particularly
revealing.
Wohlfarth gives this account of neo-con linguistic discipline in
"Unipolar World," op. cit.

JS

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc., 1952), chap. 18, p. 25. In chapter fifteen he had already offered this
foretaste : "Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own
[remain in power] to know how to do wrong [to act immorally], and to
make use of it or not according to necessity" (chap. 15, p. 22). See
Quentin Skinner's exposition of Machiavelli's rejection of classic
humanist as well as Christian virtue traditions in Machiavelli, pp. 38-53 .

Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli: A Ve1y Short Introduction (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000) p. I.
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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Max Lerner, "Introduction," in Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and
The Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. xxxiv.
Ibid., p. xxxiv. Lerner rightly places the ethical opposite the ruthless,
but the ethical need not be the polar opposite of realism.
See Skinner's exposition of Machiavelli's critical overturning of
Western public ethics, classical humanist and Christian (Machiavelli,
pp. 23-53). In part 2 above I complied with the standard account and
grouped Machiavelli with the second modern justification for empire.
He actually fits within the fourth "moral" rationale. Machiavelli
addressed quite a different treatise to the ruled than he did to the rulers;
see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, lllinois: Free Press,
1958). pp. 15-53.
Usually people regard Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the father of modem
aristocratic, republican democracy and for good reason. Still, his
predecessor is Machiavelli, whose more republican treatise is
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy. For the relation between
Machiavelli and political republicanism see Strauss, op.cit, pp. 9-53;
and see Skinner (op. cit., pp. 3-7). Notoriously, Rousseau's proposal is
"an exceedingly complicated puzzle," which from the beginning
produced different even contradictory polities; see Wilhnoore Kendall,
"Introduction," in The Social Contract (Chicago: Henry Regency Co,
1954), pp. vii-xiii. Rousseau provided an aristocratic moral rationale for
a constitutional republic fonn of democracy. In US history James
Madison saw the dilemma but could resolve it satisfactorily; see Ronald
Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), pp. 19-33.
Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 40.
Ibid. Wohlfarth's bases "unipolarization" on ordered stability; see
"Unipolar World," pp. 5-41.

Wohlfmth (op. cit.) uses both the logic of "can means ought" and the
logic that "order" is the form of justice that results in peace. The
"unambiguously unipolar" world is, therefore, inevitably and durably
"prone to peace." Peace is the byproduct of a "decisive preponderance
in all the underlying components of power: economic, military,
technological, and geopolitical." These are the four "deeply embedded
material condition[s]" that make peace real. "Hence both the overall
size and the comprehensiveness of the leader's power advantage are
crucial to peacefulness. If the system is unipolar, the great power
hierarchy should be much more stable than a system of more than one
pole." In hegemonic theory this is called full-spectrum dominance. Just
call it "empire"!
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Niebuhr, Nations and Empires. p. 4. A penetrating and exhaustive
analysis of this phenomenon and its history of effects in Western social
and political theory is Alvin W. Gouldner, Enter Plato: Classical Greece
and the Origins of Social The01y (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
Gouldner extends this analysis to include twentieth-century systems
theory in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic
Books, 1970). Wolfarth's analysis of order, stability, and durability has
deep roots in the assumptions of a dominant fonn of systems theory.
Galatians 6:7. Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs 81.5, shows why neo-con
internationalist imperialism cannot be sustained.
Donald Kagan makes the neo-con case for "resolve"; see "Strength and
Will: A Historical Perspective," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers,
pp. 337-362 .

47

Ibid., p. 350.

.as

Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. xxv, p. 35 . For Machiavelli's virtue of
"resolve" see Skinner, Machiavelli, pp. 28-35, 38-42.

...

Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. xxv, p. 35 .
President Bush's February 8, 2004 interview on NBC's Meet the Press
with Tim Russert is a good example of the overall ethos of
epistemological
resolve;
see
the
transcript
at
http://msnbc.msn.com/jd/4179618/. Russert: "Mr. President, the
Director of the CIA said that his briefings had qualifiers and caveats, but
when you spoke to the country, you said, 'there is no doubt.' When Vice
President Cheney spoke to the country, he said, ' there is no doubt. '
Secretary Powell, 'no doubt.' Secretary Rumsfeld, ' no doubt, we know
where the weapons are.' You said, quote, 'The Iraqi regime is a threat of
unique urgency. ' 'Saddam Hussein is a threat that we must deal with as
quickly as possible.' You gave the clear sense that this was an
immediate threat that must be dealt with." President Bush: "I think, if I
might remind you that in my language I called it a grave and gathering
threat, but I don' t want to get into word contests. But what I do want to
share with you is my sentiment at the time. There was no doubt in my
mind Saddam Hussein was a danger to America. No doubt."

51

Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 43.
Recall the subtitle of Present Dangers - Crisis and Opportunity in
American Foreign Policy and Defense Policy.
1992 is the year that Wolfowitz produced his Pentagon memo that got
roundly criticized; see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why
New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security 17.4 (Spring
1993):5-51.
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Donnelly identifies these three periods; see "The Proof of Primacy,"
National Security Outlook (February 2004): www.aei.org. Donnelly's
National Security Outlook represents a more internationalist agenda for
AEI.
See Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly, "The Bush Doctrine," at
www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20020 130.htm. Donnelly's
more extensive analysis of "the Bush doctrine" is "The Underpinnings
of the Bush Doctrine," National Security Outlook, February I, 2003 at
www.aei.org/publications/pubiD.I5845/pub detail.asp.
William Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism," The Washington
Post, January 31, 2002 at www.newamericancentury.org/defense20020131.htm; and William Kristol, "President's Speech on the Middle
East," at www.newamericancentury.org/bushspeech-062502.htm.
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism."
5R

,,,

Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism."
Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism."
Robert Kagan, "Powell's Moment," The Washington Post, February I 0,
2002 at www.newamericancentury.org/defense-2002021 O.htm.

61

Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism."
Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"' The National Security Strategy
ofthe United States of America is at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

••

Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, pp. 61-63 .
Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada,"'

,,,

See William Kristol, eta/., "Dear Mr. President," January 23, 2003 at
www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20030123 .htm, a letter signed
by twenty-seven prominent neo-cons.
Donnelly, "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine."
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Boot, "Doctrine ofthe 'Big Enchilada,"'
Simpson, '"By the Dawn's Early Light."'
See Kristol, eta!., "Dear Mr. President."

Machiavelli, The Prince. Because William Bennett, Mr. Virtue (The
Book of Virtues [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993]), writes the
"character" chapter in Present Dangers with an onslaught on President
Clinton, he would be an excellent case study for secrecy, given his now
outed gambling habit, secreted for years even from his wife. Still, in a
paraphrase, secrecy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue. "0,
Almighty God, to whom all hearts are open, all desires known, and from
whom no secrets are hid, cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by the
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For the full text of Lazarus' famous poem, for an excellent resource
about her life, for a brief, critical analysis of her poetic contribution to
American public life, and for a helpful bibliography see
http://www.jwa.org/exhjbjts/lazarus/.
See the stunning investigation by renowned Republican political
analyst, Kevin Phillips (American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and
the Problem ofDeceit in the House ofBush (New York: Viking Penguin,
2004). Four chief components have over time established the Bush
dynasty: financial cronyism, manipulation of energy markets, cozy
connections with the bounty of the military-industrial complex, and the
secret ties within the national security and intelligence community.
Democratic expectations make cloaking necessary. Machiavelli did not
have such democratic "hardships." Luther insightfully and decisively
notes how "cloaking" violates the Second Commandment's prohibition
of blasphemy, and he theologically bases his own critical theory in the
Second Commandment (see Luther, The Large Catechism in The Book
of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, eds.
Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert [Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress
Press, 2000], pp. 392-396).

7J

W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folks, ed. Herbe1t Aptheker
(Mil wood, New York: Kraus-Thomson, 1973). DuBois noted that this
double consciousness, the one of slave culture and the other of master
culture, gave blacks a double dose of cultural knowledge and thus an
emancipatory epistemological advantage. Worth considering is whether
Bush enjoys a reverse, imperialist epistemological advantage.
For the neo-con claim to have "created" the Iraq War see Donnelly,
"Brave New World." "A US victory [in the Iraq War] . . . will define the
start of a truly new world order; to steal Dean Acheson's famous phrase,
we are present at the creation." Also see Robert Kagan,
"Multilateralism, American Style," The Washington Pos, September 13,
2002 at www. newamerjcanceotury.or!V~Iobal-091302.htm; Kagan calls
the War "an American-created reality on Iraq," actually a neo-con
created War.

15

Kristol, "Taking the War Beyond Terrorism." For the Iraq War invention
during the neo-con preparation period see Richard Perle, "Iraq: Saddam
Unbound," in Kagan and Kristol, Present Dangers, pp. 107-108.

Colin Powell, "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council," at
www.state. ~oy/secretary/rm/2003 /J 7300.htm. Note in his statement the
neo-con discourse of"present dangers." Secretary Powell had forty-five
slides with his address. He used nine specially designed slides that
emphasized his epistemological resolve. Each of these nine featured an
ominous grey-black background. Each said, "IRAQ - Failing To
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2
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Disann - ." At his "gravity of this moment" statement he featured
"IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Biological Weapons." As his speech
continued he piled on the certainty with "IRAQ- Failing To Disann Chemical Weapons," then "IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Nuclear
Weapons," then "IRAQ - Failing To Disann- Delivery Systems," then
"IRAQ - Failing To Disann - Terrorism," then "IRAQ - Failing To
Disann - Human Rights Violations." Everyone knows that the last
certainty-slide is true; everyone also now knows that the "certainties" of
the previous five lie along a spectrum from disinformation to
misinfonnation.
11

These officials include Vice President Dick Cheney on August 29, 2002
to veterans of the Korean War in San Antonio, TX; the President on
September 12, 2002 at the United Nations; Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld on September 18, 2002 before the US House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee and on September 19, 2002
before the US Senate Armed Services Committee. You can find all of
these
speeches
at
either
the
Associated
Press
site
www.newslibrm:y.com/sites/apab/ or
http://nI. newsban k.com/nl.search/we/ Archives?
George F. Will, "To win, Bush will have to tell it like it is," Washington
Post, February 8, 2004. David Kay, President Bush's Iraq arms
inspector, resigned from his post in January 2004 and was interviewed
by Liane Hansen on National Public Radios Weekend Edition. Since
then the world knows that Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction
have been missing in action for many years. Likely, Will's sudden case
of conscience has arisen due to the imminent threat of an election.

70

See Jonathan Snow, "The Case for War in Iraq," February 3, 2004 at
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/pub Iicati ons/pub Iications show.htm?
doc id=205195; Snow is Manager, Research and Messaging, The
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Employing rhetorical
discipline Snow quibbles about words denying that the Bush
administration ever used the tenn "imminent threat" when justifying the
Iraq War. It undoubtedly and abundantly used many publicly equivalent
phrases. Futther, in his 2003 State of the Union Address the President
did in fact point to Iraq as an "imminent threat" by mocking those who
"have said we must not act until the threat is imminent" (at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0 1120030 128-19.htm. It is
likely that the President had actually jettisoned the "imminent threat"
portion of the "just cause" criterion of the just war tradition, at least in
his own thinking; and that he had substituted a neo-con war realist and
imperial rationale that advances "a wider view of the traditional
doctrine of 'imminent danger."' Neo-cons, at least, say this about the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
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President; see Donnelly, "Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine." The
President's strategic abandonment of this traditional just war criterion,
even as he professes fighting "in a just cause and by just means," leads
to his imperialist preemption doctrine.

80

Clifford D. May, "The Imperfect Stonn: Anti-war Warriors Cloud Recent
History," Scripps Howard News Service, January 15, 2004 at
www.defenddemocracy.org/jn the media/in the media show.htm?do
c jd=203139; May is President, The Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies. President Bush included at least four of these reasons in
his January 20, 2004 State of the Union Address.

81

George Will's Johnny-come-lately advise surely fits the case here: "Once
begun, leakage of public confidence in a president's pronouncements is
difficult to staunch;" see Will, "To win, Bush will have to tell it like it is."
See, for instance, Thomas Donnelly's analysis in "Iraq Is the Central
Front," National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute,
(October 2003). Donnelly notes, 'The most forceful argument against
the [Bush] doctrine is that it is too audacious, too costly for America to
accept - even after the attacks of September II supposedly woke us
from a decade's slumber." "Too audacious" is neo-con linguistic
discipline. "Too audacious" really means too imperialist. Neo-cons
know that they are most vulnerable in the court of US and international
public opi.nion when the imperialist charge is made to stick. Neo-cons
orient their linguistic discipline to combat the charge of imperialism.
For this reason discerning implicit imperialism is crucial!

ll

President Bush, State of the Union Address, 2004, op. cit.
William Satire, "Clearly, we're reversing march of terror," New York
Times, January 12, 2004. Beyond Libya, Satire's progressively
ascending slippery slope includes Afghanistan, Syria, the Palestinian
West Bank, Iran, and North Korea.
See Gary M. Simpson, Critical Social Themy: Prophetic Reason, Civil
Society, and Christian Imagination (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress
Press, 2002), pp. 27-52.

86

Donnelly, "Brave New World."

87

Thomas Friedman, "What really was gross about halftime show," New
York Times, February 9, 2004. The following paragraphs in the main
text refer to this editorial.
Robert Kagan, "Multilateralism, American Style." The quotations in
this paragraph and the next two are from Kagan. Caesar also soundly
rejects principled multilateralism and favors an expedient
internationalism; see Caesar, "The Great Divide," p. 41.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/2

59

God Against Empire

••
'"'
•I

Russe1t's February 8, 2004 interview with President Bush, op. cit.
See Martin Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," (American
Edition of Luther Works [St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955-1986]
[hereafter LW]), Vol. 46.

s

Wolfowitz, "Statesmanship in the New Century," p. 309.
This stands at the heart of "Honour your father and your mother" as
Christians throughout the ages have taught. Luther is a good example
among a host of possible examples in this regard. He finds key aspects
of his doctrine of vocation in the "fourth" commandment, especially in
regard to "honour;" see Simpson, "Lutheran 'Delight,"' pp. 26-29.

9)

See Simpson, "Lutheran 'Delight,"' pp. 37-44.
Martin Luther, "Commentary on Psalm 101," (1534) LW, Vol. 13, pp.
154-175. Luther, referring to Aristotle, imagines these extraordinary
leaders as a kind of non-hereditary, free-floating, ad hoc aristocracy
(LW; Vol. 13, pp. 161 ). Shortly after the failure of the 1530 Diet of
Augsburg to bring peace within the empire, Luther readies the German
people for just such a "raising up" by God. Increasingly, he invokes the
figure of Judas Maccabeus; see Luther, "Dr. Mmtin Luther's Warning to
His Dear German People" ( 1531) LW, Vol. 47, p. 17.
Martin Luther, "Commentary on Psalm 82," (LW, Vol. 13, pp. 49-51 ).
This is often called "Luther's Treatise on the Christian Prince." In "A
Sermon on Keeping Children in School" (1530) Luther again extols the
role that the office of preaching plays vis-a-vis political authority (LW,
Vol. 46, pp. 226-227). Significantly, he argues that preachers should
exercise the admonitory obligation of their office a fully public and
open forum (LW, Vol. 47, pp. 21-29).
Martin Luther, "On War against the Turk" ( 1529) LW. Vol. 46, pp. 170.
Martin Luther, The Large Catechism, p. 419; also see Martin Luther,
"Admonition to Peace," ( 1525) LT¥, Vol. 46, pp. 32, 41.
Martin Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be
Obeyed," (1523) LW, Vol. 45, pp. 116.

w

Ibid., p. 121.

""'

Cicero, The Republic in Loeb Classic LibrGIJJ, ed. T.E. Page,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966) I, xxvi,
41.

101

Ibid., I, xxvi, p. 41; I, pp. xlv, 69.

101

Ibid., II, pp. xxxii, 57.

101

Simpson, Critical Social The01y, pp. 101-122.
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Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address."
Historically, US aristocrats embedded their economic reduction of
"Give me your tired, your poor," in a two-tiered educational system.
The aristocrats get education in the humanities and the "huddled
masses" get technological training, pedagogical equivalent of"let them
eat cake." See "Education: Technical and Moral," in Robert Bellah, et
a/., The Good Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991 ), pp. 145-178.

107

"The voice ofthe people is the voice of God." The Latin phrase appears
in striking gold leaf on the sky blue wall of the legislative chambers of
the State Capitol in St. Paul, MN. This is Ciceronian common place in
Western political discourse. It likely appeared in one of the numerous
missing sections Cicero's The Republic. A famous rejection of it was
issued by Alcuin in the year 800 A.D. Alcuin was Emperor
Charlemagne's court theologian and imperial apologist. Monarchists
discern God's voice in the well born, aristocrats in the well bred, and
imperialists in the coercively empowered.

IOfl

Lincoln, Gettysburg Address.

,.,.

See John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003). There is an explosion of research in global civil
society and related phenomena. Keane provides an extensive
bibliography.

""

NGOWatch is "A project of The American Enterprise Institute and the
Federalist Society, at www.ngowatch.org. NGOWatch is quite careful
how it articulates its purpose. While clearly worried and suspicious, it
projects - or is it feigns? - respect. It is particularly interested in the
effect that INGOs have on "sovereignty." Sovereignty touches, of
course, the question of the international rule of law. See
"http://www.ngowatch.org/treaties.htm#Sov"

Ill

See Elaine L. Chao, "Address to The Federalist Society," November 14,
2003 at "http://www.ngowatch.org/ChaoAddress.pdf. U.s'' Chao, US
Secretary of Labor, recognizes the significance ofNGOs and INGOs for
the future of nation-state sovereignty and is exceedingly anxious about
this. From this address I can make no judgment either whether she
considers herself a neo-con internationalist or whether she could
legitimately be placed ideationally among them.
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